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Abstract
The integration of medical devices in everyday life
prompts the idea that these devices will increasingly
have evidential value in civil and criminal
proceedings. However, the investigation of these
devices presents new challenges for the digital forensics
community. Previous research has shown that mobile
devices provide investigators with a wealth of
information. Hence, mobile devices that are used within
medical environments potentially provide an avenue for
investigating and analyzing digital evidence from such
devices.
The research contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, it provides an empirical analysis of the viability of
using information from smartphone applications
developed to complement a medical device, as digital
evidence. Second, it includes documentation on the
artifacts that are potentially useful in a digital forensics
investigation of smartphone applications that interact
with medical devices.

1. Introduction
The integration of information technology into
medical settings introduces a variety of opportunities
and challenges from security and investigation
perspectives. Medical devices such as ventilators,
pacemakers and infusion pumps, which initially
operated as standalone devices, now integrate network
technology that permits communication with a variety
of connected healthcare systems [1]. This integration
has resulted in several benefits including improved
patient safety, reduced workloads for medical
professionals, and the increased generation of medical
data [2, 3].
According to Qualcomm Life [4, 5], next-generation
medical devices will produce and collect vast amounts
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of medical and patient information. For example, a
typical ventilator is expected to generate almost 305
data parameters per second, which includes patient
information, therapy details, and device operation
metadata [4, 5]. Based on these predictions, a Stanford
Medicine report goes on to estimate that the medical
industry will generate 2,314 exabytes of data by 2020
[6]. From a digital forensics’ perspective, medical
device data could provide a forensic investigator with a
wealth of potential evidence.
Previous research indicates that digital evidence is
becoming increasingly important in a variety of legal
situations [7-9]. Hence, it is only a matter of time before
medical device data becomes prominent in civil and
criminal cases. Support for these predictions is already
evident in criminal cases in the United States. For
example, in Middletown Ohio, law enforcement
investigators issued a search warrant to collect
information from an individual’s pacemaker [10]. This
information was then used to charge the individual with
a variety of crimes, including arson. Similarly, a court
in Pennsylvania admitted evidence from a fitness watch
device to support charges of false reports to law
enforcement, false alarms to public safety, and
tampering with evidence [11]. However, the digital
evidence was only analyzed by investigators after the
defendant provided their username and password.
Hence, defendants who do not provide device
authentication information introduce additional barriers
for digital forensic investigators. Consequently,
researchers have speculated that the collection and
analysis, of residual data from medical devices, are
unlikely to be straightforward [2]. The underlying
problem is the absence of digital forensic consideration
in the design of medical products, introducing
uncertainty as to the viability of conventional
approaches to forensic evidence acquisition in medical
environments [2].
Traditionally, when a storage device is involved in a
crime, the equipment is seized to obtain an accurate

Page 4276

copy of the data stored on the device for later analysis
[12]. Typically, devices connect to an investigator’s
computer via a write-blocker. An investigator then
creates a byte-for-byte copy (an image) of the entire
storage device using commercial software tools, such as
FTK or Encase, or an open source alternative like ‘dd’.
During the analysis phase of an investigation, an
investigator appraises the significance of extracted
information artifacts. The investigator then develops a
narrative based on the extracted residual data and
constructs a timeline using the data to explain how a
crime was potentially committed. Where appropriate, it
may also be necessary to associate particular artifacts
with one or more user IDs. Evidence recovered from
traditional storage media (e.g., documents, images,
multimedia files, and metadata) is known to assist with
this type of analysis. However, it is not clear that the
residual data recovered from medical devices and their
associated applications will support similar analysis
activities. The overall lack of clarity is due to the variety
of medical devices available in the market in
conjunction with the deficiency of knowledge about the
‘forensic-ability’ (i.e., the existence and availability of
timestamp information and relevant metadata) of
medical device evidence.
One medical device that has received particular
attention in the past twelve months is the Kardia Mobile
[13-15]. Kardia is a hand-held single-lead
Electrocardiography (ECG) device that utilizes a
smartphone to detect and monitor Atrial Fibrillation
(AF) [15]. From a safety perspective, Kardia and its
associated smartphone application are approved for use
by both the United States Food And Drug
Administration and the European Union [16]. The
device is intended to assist medical professionals in the
treatment of patients with known or suspected heart
conditions, such as AF [15, 16].
The increased usage of residual data in court cases
in conjunction with recent legal activities supports the
idea that approved medical devices, such as the Kardia,
will escalate in importance in legal contexts. It is also
realistic to speculate that as network connectivity and
digital functionality increase in medical devices, that
these devices will increasingly become cybersecurity
targets. This line of thought prompts the hypothesis that
a medical device smartphone application can provide
forensically relevant data. To address the hypothesis,
the following questions were proposed:
• Can metadata, concerning a patient and their use
of the medical device be recovered from a
smartphone application?
• Can medical information be recovered from an
accompanying smartphone application?
The research contribution of this paper is twofold.
First, it provides an empirical analysis of the viability of

using information from smartphone applications
developed to complement a medical device, as evidence
in legal cases. Second, it provides documentation on the
artifacts that are potentially useful in a digital forensics
investigation of smartphone applications that interact
with medical devices. This paper is structured as
follows. Section two discusses relevant previous
research related to medical devices and smartphone
forensics. Section three presents the experiment design
implemented in this research. Section four reports the
experimental findings, and a discussion of the results.
Finally, Section five draws conclusions from the work
conducted and presents ideas for future research.

2. Related Work
Researchers are continuously demonstrating that
medical devices are at risk from a security perspective
[17-21]. Malasri and Wang [17] examined the insecurity
of implantable medical devices, such as pacemakers.
These researchers argue that implantable medical
devices are susceptible to a variety of attacks including
eavesdropping, patient tracking, and spoofing. They
concluded that a malicious attacker could, in theory,
cause direct physical harm to an individual by sending
malicious commands to compromise the security of
such devices. Glisson et al. [18] examined the viability
of compromising a medical mannequin, in a live
hospital environment. In addition to demonstrating two
types of brute force attacks, these researchers also
explained how a medical mannequin is vulnerable to a
denial of service attack. Li et al. [19] focused their
research on a diabetes therapy device and reported that
some medical devices transmit patient and device
information in plaintext. After analyzing transmitted
information, they reported that they were able to recover
device passwords and network data packets containing
dosage information.
Growing security concerns with medical devices
have prompted the application of increased regulatory
pressure on healthcare organizations to require forensic
investigation capabilities [22]. Digital forensics is
concerned with the collection, analysis, and
admissibility of collected data in a legal context [23].
Forensic investigations attempt to establish answers to
five key questions, known as the five W’s: what, why,
who, when, and where [23]. From a medical device
perspective, researchers have raised concerns regarding
the forensic investigation of such devices [1, 2, 18, 24,
25].
Grispos et al. [2] argue that in order to answer the
five W’s, investigators rely on the residual data from
devices and systems involved in a crime. However, they
speculate that such data might not always be available
within medical devices, and as a result, investigators
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might not be able to identify suspects or facts within an
investigation. In line with these thoughts, Glisson et al.
[18] indicated that the digital forensics community
required further research to identify medical device
residual data, which could be used in a forensic
investigation.
Cusack and Kyaw [1] proposed an alternative
network-centric solution based on the integration of
forensic capabilities during the development of medical
devices and systems. They proposed a forensicallyready hospital wireless network architecture but do not
attempt to address residual data generated by medical
devices. Ellouze et al. [24] focused on the type of
evidence that is needed in medical device investigations,
including data collected from sensor nodes, mobile
devices, wireless medical devices, databases, and thirdparty applications. In later work, Ellouze et al. [25]
proposed a theoretical investigation framework to help
guide a post-mortem analysis of implantable medical
devices. Part of this solution involves developing a set
of techniques to assist with the secure storage of
evidence logs on mobile devices, which can be used to
track sensitive medical events.
When mobile devices are used within medical
environments, they potentially provide an avenue for
investigating and analyzing digital evidence. Mobile
device forensics is defined as “the science of recovering
digital evidence from a mobile device under forensically
sound conditions using acceptable methods” [26]. From
a digital forensics perspective, a mobile device can be
considered a treasure trove of forensic evidence [27-29].
A study by Glisson et al. [27] involving the analysis of
49 low-end devices acquired from second-hand
markets, recovered more than 11,000 artifacts.
However, the advancement of smartphones has resulted
in the generation of richer artifacts such as webbrowsing activities, third-party application data and
GPS coordinates [28]. As a result, several researchers
have focused their efforts on understanding the residual
artifacts generated on smartphone devices.
Grispos et al. [30, 31] and Martini et al. [32]
analyzed mobile cloud storage applications on Android
and iOS devices. This analysis included the
identification of data and metadata, along with their
locations on the mobile device. Al Mutawa et al. [33]
examined social networking applications, such as
Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace, on Android, iOS, and
Blackberry devices. While minimal artifacts could be
recovered from Blackberry devices, the researchers
observed that evidentiary artifacts concerning these
applications could be recovered from Android and iOSbased devices. Anglano [34] focused on examining the
artifacts generated by users who use the communication
application, WhatsApp. The findings from this research
show that artifacts could be recovered from databases,

which can be used to reconstruct the list of contacts and
the chronology of the messages that have been
exchanged between users. Badar and Baggili [35]
examined the logical backup generated from an Apple
iPhone when connected to iTunes, with the goal of using
this backup as a source of forensic artifacts. Using this
approach, Badar and Baggili [35] recovered a variety of
iPhone-related artifacts including the device’s address
book, incoming and outgoing call logs, text messages,
email account information, and internet browser history.
Levinson et al. [28] examined partitions on an iPhone
device with the aim of identifying residual data from
built-in applications. From an artifact perspective,
Levinson et al. [28] recovered user account information,
timestamps, geolocation information, contacts and
multimedia files from the device.
In addition to the above applications and operating
systems, researchers have focused on the examination
of Mobile Health (mHealth) and well-being
applications. Plachkinova et al. [36] focused on the
security and privacy of 38 Android and iOS mHealth
applications with the objective of developing a
taxonomy based on security and privacy issues
identified from the applications. Kharrazi et al. [37]
examined nineteen mHealth applications on iOS,
Blackberry, and Android devices and reported that
seven of the evaluated applications did not implement
security features such as password protection and user
authentication. From a forensics perspective, Azfar et al.
[38] examined 40 Android mHealth applications and
proposed a forensic taxonomy that comprises databases,
user credentials, personal details of users, user activities,
user location, activity timestamps, and images. While
previous research has examined residual, security and
privacy issues in medical devices and mHealth
applications, minimal research examines the generation
of smartphone application residual data as a
consequence of interacting with a medical device.

3. Experiment Design
In order to answer the hypothesis and associated
research questions identified in the introduction, a
controlled experiment was undertaken [39]. This
controlled experiment consisted of five stages. The five
stages included: 1) preparing a smartphone device for
use in the experiment; 2) installing the Kardia
application onto a smartphone device and setting up a
test account for use in the experiment; 3) using the
Kardia application and the Kardia Mobile ECG device;
4) processing the smartphone device using
MicroSystemation (MSAB) XRY; and 5) using forensic
tools to extract files and artifacts from the extraction
dumps.
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The mobile device forensic toolkit used in this
experiment was MSAB’s XRY version 7.7 and its
associated analysis tool, XAMN version 3.2 [40]. Files
and artifacts associated with the Kardia application were
then extracted from the memory dumps using XAMN
and analyzed further using AccessData Forensic Toolkit
(FTK) version 6.3 [41]. These tools were chosen based
on practicality and availability to the authors.
Two smartphone devices were included in this
experiment: a Samsung Galaxy S4 and an Apple iPhone
SE (hereafter referred to as the devices). Table 1 Smartphone Devices, presents an overview of these
devices, their features and storage capabilities. These
devices were selected based on their compatibility with
the XRY forensic toolkit that was used to extract a
memory dump of the device’s internal memory. In
addition, the Android and iOS operating systems
executed on the devices represent the two most popular
smartphone operating systems, at the time of the
research [42]. A number of smartphone devices fulfill
these criteria and could have been used in the research.
The decision to use these specific devices was based on
availability.
Feature
Model
Number
Operating
System
Storage
Capacity

Galaxy S4

iPhone SE

SGH-i337

A1662

Android v. 5.0
(Lollipop)

iOS v. 11.3.1

16 GB

32 GB

Table 1: Smartphone Devices
The smartphone application used in this experiment
was Kardia version 5.1.2, for both Android and iOS
operating systems. The following steps were undertaken
to prepare the devices and applications for the
experiment. These steps were executed for both the
Android and iOS smartphone devices.
1. The device was ‘hard reset’ to remove any
previous data. This involved restoring the factory
settings on the device. A desktop computer was
used to create, depending on the device, a Google
or Apple account. The device was then poweredon, and the account was used to complete the
initial device setup. All default device setup
options were selected during this initial process.
2. The device was then connected to a wireless
network, which was used to gain access to the
Internet. The Kardia application was downloaded
and installed using the device’s respective
application store (Google Play and the Apple
App Store). The default installation and security
parameters were used during the installation of
the application. The Kardia application was

executed, and a new profile was created using an
email address created for the purpose of the
experiment and a common password. The profile
information recorded included: first name, last
name, date of birth, height, gender, and smoker
status. Test information was used for the purpose
of completing the profile. After the initial setup,
the default settings were used on the Kardia
application. This included settings for restricting
an ECG recording to thirty seconds, permitting
voice notes and enabling a thirty-day premium
service trial.
3. After the Kardia application setup was
completed, the application was used to record an
initial measurement using the Kardia Mobile
device. This initial measurement is required
before the Kardia Mobile and application can be
used by a patient. The measurement is recorded
and then submitted to a medical professional by
the application, on behalf of the patient. After a
notification was received that the initial
recording was successful, the Kardia Mobile and
the application were then used twice a day for
five days. The date and time of each recording,
along with the ‘result’ provided on the
smartphone interface by the Kardia application
were documented for future reference. In
addition to recording ECG measurements, the
smartphone application interface was also used to
manually record blood pressure recordings and
weight information. Test information was used
for the purpose of these measurements, which
were documented for future analysis.
4. Upon completion of the five-day period, the
smartphone device was processed using the XRY
toolkit to create a memory dump of its internal
memory. In the case of the Galaxy S4, the device
was processed to create a ‘Physical Acquisition’
of the internal memory. This extraction process
first involved activating the ‘USB Debugging’
option on the smartphone device. A step-by-step
wizard provided instructions on how to prepare
the device for the extraction, and a number of
forensic programs were then loaded onto the
smartphone. The Galaxy S4’s internal memory
was then read, and a memory dump was saved to
a folder on the desktop of a forensic workstation.
The entire process took approximately forty
minutes.
The extraction process for the Apple SE differed
from that of the Galaxy S4. In the case of the
Apple SE, only a ‘Full Read Logical’ extraction
was possible using the XRY forensic toolkit.
Nonetheless, this type of extraction can still be
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used to recover the Kardia application folder
located within the User partition on the Apple
Device. A step-by-step wizard provided
instructions on how to prepare the device for the
logical acquisition. The resulting extraction was
then saved on the desktop of a forensic
workstation. The
entire process took
approximately fifteen minutes.
5. The subsequent forensic extractions that were
created using the XRY were then loaded in
XAMN, where the Android and iOS file systems
were reconstructed. The analysis techniques used
to locate files and artifacts related to the Kardia
application included: string searching, text
filtering, and browsing the respective file
systems. Files and artifacts were also extracted
from the memory dumps using XMAN and
analyzed further using FTK.
The scope of this research is restricted in the
following ways. The experiment was conducted in the
United States (US) using devices that contain network
software for carrier providers in the US. The experiment
was executed only once on each device. The experiment
focused on a specific version of the Android and iOS
operating systems, a specific version of the Kardia
application, and specific versions of XRY and FTK.
Due to tool limitation, a Logical Extraction was the sole
extraction method for the iOS device, while a Physical
Extraction was the extraction method for the Android
device. It should also be noted that the primary
researcher was both a participant and a researcher in the
experiment.

forensic investigation. ECG files generated by the
Kardia Mobile device can be recovered from the
location:
com.alivecor.aliveecg/files/
ecgs. Two ECG files are generated for each reading
taken with the Kardia, and both files contain an .atc
file extension. Figure 1 presents an extract of the file
header information for these files using FTK. This file
header information contains the date and time the
reading was taken. It also contains the ECG reading’s
identifier
number
(3db73498-32a0-4293-b5f07616162c55d8), the smartphone device used to take the
recording, and the version of Kardia Mobile.

Figure 1: Android .ATC File Header
An analysis of the subfolder called temp under the
folder
com.alivecor.aliveecg/files/
revealed PDF documents. These PDF documents
contain any ECG recordings that are referred to a
medical professional for further analysis. Figure 2
presents an extract of this PDF document, which
includes patient information, the patient’s date of birth,
when the recording was undertaken, and the heart rate
documented as beats per minute.

4. Results and Discussion
An analysis of the Android and iOS memory dumps
revealed that a variety of artifacts related to the Kardia
Mobile could be recovered from its smartphone
application. These artifacts can be broadly categorized
as medical-type data, patient information, and usergenerated metadata.

4.1. Kardia Application on Android
Within an Android device, user-related files and
metadata are stored under the location /data/data
[43]. Kardia Mobile artifacts were recovered
from an application folder called com.alivecor.
aliveecg that was stored under the /data/data
location. Medical-type artifacts can be recovered from
various locations in the application folder. Within the
high-level folder is a subfolder called Files. This
contains various subfolders of potential interest to a

Figure 2: PDF of ECG Recording
In addition to the ECG recordings, audio files related
to the recordings can be found in the location:
com.alivecor.aliveecg/files/. These files
are in two formats: Advanced Audio Coding (.aac) and
MPEG 4 Audio (.m4a). The files are thirty seconds long
and record audio sounds during the ECG recording. The
audio file name can be used to look up the
corresponding ECG recording using the UUID value in
the database discussed below.
Patient information and metadata related to the
Kardia can be recovered from a database called
ECG.db. This database contains thirteen tables,
documenting various metadata and can be recovered
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from the location: com.alivecor.aliveecg/
databases. The table bp_records contains
metadata related to blood pressure recordings. This
includes timestamp information, timestamp offsets, if
the record is deleted or not, systolic and diastolic
readings, the heart rate at the time of the recording and
the source of the blood pressure recording. It must be
noted that the timestamp information was not in the
local time but stored as an epoch timestamp according
to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). As a result, the
timestamp offset (-18000 seconds) must be applied to
the documented timestamp to obtain the actual day and
time associated with the recording.
Within the ECG table, metadata related to the patient
and their ECG recordings can be recovered. This
metadata includes the patient’s first and last name, as
well as their date of birth (stored as a GMT epoch
timestamp). The table also stores information related to
ECG readings taken using the Kardia Mobile device.
Metadata information related to these ECG readings is
summarized in Table 2 below.
Field Name(s)
uuid and
server_id
data Recorded
duration
heart_rate

inverted
height
weight
gender
smoker
has_audio_file

Description
Recording ID numbers
Date and time that the ECG
recording was undertaken
Duration in milliseconds of each
ECG recording
Patient’s heart rate in beats per
minute
The position of the Kardia
Mobile at the time of the
reading: upside down (1) or
correct side up (0)
Patient’s height in centimeters
Patient’s weight in kilograms
Patients gender: female (0) or
male (1)
As entered by the patient, nonsmoker (0) or smoker (1)
If an audio file is available (1) or
not available (0)

Table 2: Android ECG Recording Fields
In addition to recovering ECG recordings, a third
table called Orders can be used to identify which ECG
recordings are submitted to a medical professional for
further analysis. Metadata related to this table includes
the ID number of the ECG recording submitted to the
medical professional, the result sent to the patient,
timestamp information describing when the analysis
was requested, along with timestamp information when

the analysis was received by the Kardia smartphone
application.
The fourth table within the ECG.db database that
contains information of potential forensic interest is
called Weight_records. The purpose of this table is
to record the patient’s weight information, as entered
through the Kardia application. Metadata, which can be
recovered from this table includes timestamp
information in epoch format (the offset must be applied
to obtain the local timestamp), the weight in kilograms,
the patient’s height in centimeters and the source of the
information. An interesting observation is that the
weight and height information recovered from the
database tables was in kilograms and centimeters.
However, at the time of the experiment, this information
was input into the smartphone interface in pounds and
feet, respectively. This would suggest that the
smartphone application is converting this information
from one format to another, before storing it in the
database table.
The Kardia application also stores patient metadata
within Extensible Markup Language (XML) files.
These XML files are stored in a subfolder called
shared_prefs within the main folder located at
com.alivecor.aliveecg/. Within shared_
prefs the following files and information can be
recovered:
• com.alivecor.aliveecg_preference
s.xml – the email account used with the Kardia
service, timestamp information related to the last
blood pressure recording, last weight recording
and last heart rate recording.
• com.google.android.gms.measureme
nt.prefs.xml
–
epoch
timestamp
information about when the Kardia application
was first used.
• userprofile.xml – the patient’s first and
last name, the patient’s date of birth, the patient’s
weight in kilograms, the patient’s email address,
the patient’s country location, and the patient’s
smoker status.

4.2. Kardia Application on iOS
An analysis of the iOS memory dumps revealed that
Kardia device artifacts are stored under the location
/private/var/mobile/containers/data/
application in a folder called com.alivecor.
professional.aliveecg. The primary location
contains two subfolders called Documents and
Library, which contain medical-type artifacts and
patient metadata. Unless stated, all timestamp

Page 4281

information recovered from the iOS application was in
local Mac Absolute Time format [44]. The format of this
timestamp is the number of seconds since midnight
January 1, 2001, GMT [44].
Within the Documents subfolder, are files
containing the audio sounds detected during the ECG
recording. These files are in the MPEG 4 Audio (.m4a)
format. The file name of the audio file corresponds to
the ZUUID metadata, which can be recovered from the
AliveECGDB.sqlite database. This can be used to
match the audio file with the corresponding ECG
reading.
A subfolder within Documents called ecgfiles
contains the Kardia native .atc files for each ECG
reading undertaken using the device. The file headers
for the .atc files recovered from the Apple device are in
the same format as those recovered from the Android
device. The header information that can be recovered
includes the data and time of the ECG recording, the
ECG reading’s identifier and the version of iOS running
on the Apple device used with the reading.
The primary metadata location for the iOS Kardia
application
is
an SQLite database called
AliveECGDB.sqlite. This database can be found in
the Documents folder and contains various tables of
interest
to
a
forensic
investigation.
The
ZKDMBLOODPRESSURERECORDING table found in
the database contains the metadata associated with
blood pressure recordings. Metadata recovered from the
table includes the systolic and diastolic values,
timestamp information, notes documented at the time of
the measurement and the heart rate. The ZKDMWEIGHT
table within the AliveECGDB. sqlite database
contains the metadata associated with weight
recordings. Metadata recovered from the table includes
the patient’s height in centimeters, timestamp
information, the patient’s weight in kilogram s, and the
information source or if the patient manually entered the
information.
Metadata associated with any ECG reading that has
been submitted to a medical professional can be
recovered from a table called ZOVERREADERORDER.
Metadata recovered from this table includes the
timestamp of when the recording was submitted for
further analysis, timestamp information of when the
medical professional completed their analysis, and the
results of this analysis. In addition, the ECG recording
ID (Z_PK) can be used to look up more information
about the submitted recording in the ZECG table.
The
largest
table
within
the
AliveECGDB.sqlite database is called ZECG.
This table contains medical information (Table 3) and
patient metadata (Table 4) related to the ECG recordings
undertaken using the iOS application.

Field Name
ZDATERECORDED

ZHEARTRATE

ZCOMMENT

ZFILENAME

ZDATESYNCED

ZDURATION_MS

ZMC_ANGINA

ZHAS_AUDIO_
DESCRIPTION

ZINVERTED

Z_IS_RESTING_
HEART_RATE

Description
Timestamp that describes
when the ECG reading was
undertaken
The results of the ECG
reading undertaken with
the Kardia, stored in beats
per minute
Text describing the audio
recording taken at the time
of the ECG reading
The file name of the .atc
file associated with the
ECG reading
Timestamp that describes
when the ECG reading was
synchronized
with
a
Kardia sever
Duration of the ECG
recording in milliseconds
Describes if the patient has
selected ‘Angina’ as a
medical condition in their
profile (1 = YES, 0 = NO)
Describes if the ECG
reading includes an audio
file (1 = YES, 0 = NO)
The position of the Kardia
Mobile at the time of the
reading: upside down (1)
or correct side up (0)
Describes if the ECG
reading taken was ‘at rest’
(1 = YES, 0 = NO)

Table 3: iOS ECG Medical Information
The iOS Kardia application also stores patient
metadata within Property List (plist) files.
These plist files are stored in a subfolder called
Preferences within the Library folder. Within
the Preferences subfolder, only one file contains
forensically-relevant information
called
com.
alivecor.professional.aliveecg.plist.
This file contains the following information:
• the patient’s first name, last name, gender and
date of birth,
• the patient’s height in centimeters,
• the patient’s email address,
• the medical conditions selected in the profile, and
• application version and timestamp information.
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Field Name
ZUUID
ZMALE

ZPATIENTFIRSTNAME

ZPATIENTLASTNAME

ZPATIENTDOB

ZHEIGHT

Description
ID numbers assigned
to each recording
Denotes if the patient
is Male (1) or Female
(0)
The patient’s first
name, as recorded in
the patient’s profile
The patient’s surname
name, as recorded in
the patient’s profile
The patient’s date of
birth, as recorded in
the patient’s profile
The patient’s height,
as recorded in the
patient’s profile

Table 4: iOS ECG Patient Information

4.3. Analysis Summary
The results indicate that the research questions
identified in the introduction, which focus on patient
metadata and medical information, are acquirable
through application data extraction analysis. The
extracted residual data identified metadata specific to
patients and their use of the medical device from the
smartphone application. This metadata included the
patient’s first and last name, the patient’s gender, the
patient’s height and weight, along with timestamp
information regarding when the patient undertook ECG
and blood pressure readings. An interesting observation
from the analysis is that some of the timestamp
information recovered from the artifacts were in the
local time zone, while other timestamp information was
stored in the Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) zone. This
scenario could potentially complicate a forensic
investigation, especially when an investigator is
attempting to undertake a timeline analysis to determine
when particular events took place.
The results from the controlled experiment have
shown that it is possible to recover medical information
from the Kardia Mobile application. On the Android and
iOS devices, this medical information included heart
rates through ECG readings, systolic and diastolic blood
pressure readings, and PDF documents of ECG
readings. In addition, the analysis of databases created
by the Kardia application revealed that it was possible
to recover medical conditions, smoker status, and audio
recordings taken at the time of ECG readings.
The overall analysis of the data supports the
hypothesis that medical device smartphone applications
can provide relevant forensic data. This statement holds

for both the Android and iOS devices analyzed during
the experiment. A forensic investigator could use the
medical information and patient metadata generated by
the Kardia application as a potential source of digital
evidence, when an investigation requires such
information.

5. Conclusion and Future Work
Digital evidence is becoming increasingly important
in a variety of legal situations. The amalgamation of
medical devices into everyday life is creating a scenario
where digital evidence from these devices could
plausibly be introduced into civil or criminal
proceedings. Hence, there is a growing interest from
both industry and academia to identify information that
can be recovered from these devices that will enable it
to be submitted as evidence to a court of law. The results
of this preliminary research demonstrate that
smartphone applications that interact with medical
devices provide an avenue for obtaining digital evidence
from these devices. The recovery of data from these
medical device applications could be used to provide a
forensic investigator with information about the health
and well-being of an individual involved, or the medical
state of an individual at a particular time. Such evidence
could be critical in criminal investigations where foulplay or medical malpractice is suspected.
Future work will examine several key areas
including analysis of other medical devices, operating
systems and investigating medical devices themselves
for forensic evidence. Further research will investigate
a greater variety of medical devices and their
accompanying smartphone applications. Further
research would also need to consider an examination of
smartphone applications from multiple operating
systems.
Future research will evaluate the results of this study
on a larger scale. The research will be expanded to
include the identification of storage and usage patterns
along with the implementation of machine learning
algorithms for the purposes of developing a user profile.
The idea behind the digital profile development is to
attempt to discover ways to tie individuals to profiles
and profiles to devices.
An additional avenue of research will investigate the
extent to which digital evidence can be recovered from
a medical device itself. The purpose of this research is
to investigate the relationship between data stored in a
smartphone application and the data stored in a physical
medical device. In theory, the extraction of both the
device and associated applications should provide a
more complete dataset from the physical medical
device. Research also needs to consider if medical
device development should integrate forensic-by-design
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principles in order to enhance forensic readiness and
enable additional data collection for investigations
involving medical devices.
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